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One important motivation for people behaving prosocially is that they want to avoid
negative and obtain positive emotions. In the prosocial behavior literature however,
the motivations to avoid negative emotions (e.g., guilt) and to approach positive
emotions (e.g., warm glow) are rarely separated, and sometimes even aggregated into
a single mood-management construct. The aim of this study was to investigate whether
anticipated guilt if not helping and anticipated warm glow if helping are influenced similarly
or differently when varying situational factors related to personal responsibility to help.
Helping scenarios were created and pilot tests established that each helping scenario
could be formulated both in a high-responsibility version and in a low-responsibility
version. In Study 1 participants read high-responsibility and low-responsibility helping
scenarios, and rated either their anticipated guilt if not helping or their anticipated warm
glow if helping (i.e., separate evaluation). Study 2 was similar but here participants
rated both their anticipated guilt if not helping and their anticipated warm glow if
helping (i.e., joint evaluation). Anticipated guilt was clearly higher in the high-responsibility
versions, but anticipated warm glow was unaffected (in Studies 1a and 1b), or even
higher in the low-responsibility versions (Study 2). In Studies 3 (where anticipated
guilt and warm glow were evaluated separately) and 4 (where they were evaluated
jointly), personal responsibility to help was manipulated within-subjects. Anticipated guilt
was again constantly higher in the high-responsibility versions but for many types of
responsibility-manipulations, anticipated warm glow was higher in the low-responsibility
versions. The results suggest that we anticipate guilt if not fulfilling our responsibility but
that we anticipate warm glow primarily when doing over and beyond our responsibility.
We argue that future studies investigating motivations for helping should measure both
anticipated negative consequences for oneself if not helping, and anticipated positive
consequences for oneself if helping.
Keywords: anticipated guilt, anticipated warm glow, emotion regulation, motivations of helping, negative state
relief model, responsibility to help
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you hear that the blood-supplies are running low in
all hospitals in your part of the country. You know that you could
help by visiting the nearby donor clinic on your way back from
work and donate blood (it would take you around 30 min). Now
imagine a similar situation, but where the donor clinic is located
far away (it would take you around 4 h to go there and donate
blood). How would you feel in both these situations in case you
decided to help, or in case you decided not to help?
The current study investigates people’s anticipated emotional
reactions when they consider helping and non-helping in
high- and low-responsibility situations. In the example above,
responsibility to help varied as a result of the personal effort
it would take to help, but personal responsibility can be varied
by manipulating many different types of situational factors. Our
central hypothesis is that people anticipate stronger negative
feelings (e.g., guilt) if not helping in high-responsibility situations
(e.g., not donating blood when the clinic is near), compared to
if not helping in low-responsibility situations (e.g., not donating
blood when the clinic is far away), but that they anticipate
stronger positive feelings (e.g., warm glow) if helping in low-
responsibility situations (e.g., donating blood when the clinic is
far away) compared to helping in high-responsibility situations
(e.g., donating blood when the clinic is near).
Our research question is embedded primarily in the literature
about underlying emotional mechanisms of prosocial behavior.
The key question to be addressed here is whether or not
anticipated guilt if not helping and anticipated warm glow if
helping should be considered two separate constructs or two
parts of a single mood-improvement construct. This research
is important because much previous research on underlying
motives for prosocial behavior has either, implicitly or explicitly,
treated guilt-avoidance and warm glow-attainment as two sides
of the same coin (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1987; Dickert et al., 2011;
Ferguson et al., 2012), or solely focused on the determinants
of one of these anticipated emotions (e.g., Lindsey, 2005;
Cryder et al., 2013). Establishing whether anticipated guilt and
anticipated warm glow are differently determined is important
given that many theories of prosocial giving assign a primary
role for both negative and positive emotions in motivating action
(e.g., Slovic, 2007).
To help guide our studies, we first review research on the
emotional underpinnings of helping. We first focus on the
negative emotion of guilt and specifically on how anticipated
guilt influences helping. We then note that there is a difference
between helping in order to avoid emotional punishment
(i.e., guilt if not helping), and helping in order to approach
emotional reward (i.e., warm glow if helping), and discuss
the literature on anticipated warm glow. The second part
reviews research related to the concept of responsibility to
help. There, we first discuss how perceived responsibility
can increase helping, and then provide a rationale for our
hypothesis that anticipated guilt if not helping and anticipated
warm glow if helping will be differently influenced by varying
situational aspects related to personal responsibility in helping
situations.
EMOTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF
HELPING
It is widely acknowledged that affect (e.g., Slovic, 2007) and
emotions (e.g., Haidt, 2003) are crucial in helping decisions.
A need-situation that does not give rise to any emotions will
likely not render any helping behavior. Many types of emotional
reactions have been suggested as possible reasons for helping, but
the current study will focus primarily on guilt and warm glow.
Guilt, Anticipated Guilt, and Helping
Guilt is an emotion that has received much attention (see
Baumeister et al., 1994; Tangney and Tracy, 2012), and its relation
to helping has been established many times (Hibbert et al.,
2007; Miller, 2010; Ahn et al., 2014). Guilt is often defined as a
negative, self-directed emotional reaction that arises as a result
of behaving immorally. Although guilt is often stronger after
doing something bad (e.g., harming), a central assumption in
this paper is that guilt can also follow from not doing something
good (e.g., not helping; O’Keefe and Figgé, 1999; Lindsey, 2005).
Importantly, guilt can refer to different things and influence
helping at different stages of the decision process (Västfjäll et al.,
2016). Both experienced integral guilt (a negative emotion elicited
by observing a need situation), and experienced incidental guilt (a
negative emotional state elicited by something else than the need
situation) have been shown to increase subsequent helping (e.g.,
Cialdini et al., 1987; Dovidio et al., 1991; Sachdeva et al., 2009;
Cryder et al., 2012; Rotella and Richeson, 2013).
Central for the current article, Baumeister et al. (2007)
convincingly argue that the anticipation of emotions is more
important than the experience of emotions as a driver of behavior
(see also Mellers et al., 1999; Malti and Krettenauer, 2013).
In the case of guilt, although experienced guilt after doing
something immoral provides salient feedback about one’s actions,
it may be argued that one of the main functions of guilt is to
“teach a lesson” and instill a strong affective cue that can guide
future behavior. The concept of anticipated guilt if not helping
therefore plays a central role in this study. Studies have shown
that anticipated guilt positively predict many types of prosocial
behavior such as donation intentions (Basil et al., 2008), recycle-
intention (Elgaaied, 2012), as well as intention to donate organs
and bone marrow (Lindsey, 2005; Wang, 2011). Also, anticipated
guilt if not helping is higher if reading about one identified victim
than if reading about many statistical victims (Lindsey, 2005;
Lindsey et al., 2007) and putting an animated face on a tree or a
bulb increase both anticipated guilt if not complying, and actual
pro-environment behavior (Ahn et al., 2014).
Helping as Emotion Regulation: Avoiding
Negative Emotions or Approaching
Positive Emotions?
For the person experiencing it, guilt undoubtedly has a negative
valance, so helping in order to relieve one’s currently experienced
guilt, and helping in order to prevent feeling guilty in the
future is exclusively about avoiding something bad. Importantly,
despite its name, the well-known Negative state relief model
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is not only about relieving negative emotions (going from a
negative to a neutral state) but also includes producing positive
emotions ( going from a neutral to a positive state; Cialdini and
Kenrick, 1976; Baumann et al., 1981; Cialdini et al., 1987). The
motivation to help is claimed to be about hedonism, improving
ones mood or “feeling better,” but it is important to notice
that one can achieve this either by avoiding the negative (i.e.,
relieving and avoiding negative emotions) or by approaching
the positive (i.e., retaining and approaching positive emotions).
The distinction between avoiding the negative and approaching
the positive has been much discussed in general terms (e.g.,
Bandura, 1986; Carver and Scheier, 1990; Roseman et al., 1990).
For example, it has been argued that emotional self-regulation
can have either a promotion focus where the question is whether
one will gain or not gain (e.g., if you do good, you will win
money), a prevention focus where the question is if whether
one will lose or not lose (e.g., if you do good you don’t lose
money), or both (Higgins, 1998). Although avoiding the negative
and approaching the positive have been distinguished in other
domains both when it comes to actual reactions (e.g., Higgins
et al., 1997) and when it comes to anticipated reactions (e.g.,
Onwezen et al., 2014; Hur and Jang, 2015), they have, with a
few exceptions, not been empirically separated in the prosocial
decision making literature. The distinction between helping in
order to avoid negative emotional consequences and helping in
order to approach positive emotional consequences for oneself is
central for this paper.
Warm Glow, Anticipated Warm Glow, and
Helping
The positive equivalent to guilt is warm glow (Andreoni, 1990;
Dunn et al., 2014). Warm glow is here conceptualized as a
pleasurable (positive) self-directed emotional reaction that arises
as a result of acting in a good or moral way. Warm glow in this
definition includes aspects of positive empathy (i.e., being happy
because someone else is happy; Andreychik and Migliaccio,
2015), as well as the self-conscious emotion of pride (i.e., being
happy because of causing a personally valued outcome, e.g.,
Tangney and Tracy, 2012). In the field of prosocial behavior, it has
been shown that people who are given a sum ofmoney and told to
spend the money on others (i.e., helping) report feeling happier
than people who are told to spend it on themselves (Dunn
et al., 2008, 2014). According to the empathic joy hypothesis, an
important motivator of helping is the amount of joy (warm glow)
the helper receives from helping (Smith et al., 1989). The amount
of warm glow one receives from helping can be affected both by
the amount of feedback (less warm glow if one does not learn
how the act of helping benefitted the victim; Smith et al., 1989)
and from the relative impact ones help could do for the victim
(more warm glow if one can make a large proportional impact;
see Duncan, 2004).
Warm glow can refer to a currently experienced positive
emotion which can influence future behavior (incidental warm
glow) but the focus here is on anticipated warm glow if helping
(e.g., Västfjäll et al., 2015). When faced with a possibility to help,
most people imagine both how they would feel in case they
decided not to help, and in case they decided to help. Previous
studies show that anticipated warm glow if helping is reduced in
situations where the helper is made aware of victims she cannot
personally help (Västfjäll et al., 2015), when the help is inefficient
(Bekkers, 2010), when there is more than one victim (Västfjäll
et al., 2014) and in situations where one is far from solving the
problem (Cryder et al., 2013). In a study investigating which types
of motivation that predict future blood donations it was found
that anticipated warm glow, but not anticipated tangible rewards,
altruistic motivations or anticipated health benefits for oneself
and one’s family, predicted future blood donation intentions
(Ferguson et al., 2008).
Although both anticipated guilt if not helping and anticipated
warm glow if helping have often been included as an underlying
mechanism of helping in earlier research, only a few previous
studies have, to our knowledge, tested anticipated negative
emotions if not helping and anticipated positive emotions if
helping side by side. For example, Cryder et al. (2013) and
Västfjäll et al. (2015) only measured anticipated warm glow if
helping, whereas, e.g., Lindsey (2005) and Ahn et al. (2014)
only measured anticipated guilt if not helping. Dickert et al.
(2011) did in fact measure both the anticipation of feeling
better if helping and the anticipated regret if not helping but
aggregated these into a single variable called mood management.
Likewise, Ferguson et al. (2012) aggregated anticipated positive
feelings associated with donating blood and anticipated negative
emotions associated with not donating blood into the same
motivation-class.
A notable exception is found in research done by Krettenauer
and colleagues. In one study they found that negative emotion
expectancies (≈ anticipated guilt) was stronger when imagining
harming than if imagining not helping, but that positive
emotion expectancies (≈ anticipated warm glow) was stronger if
imagining helping than if imagining not harming (Krettenauer
and Johnston, 2011). Another study found similar results for
both self-oriented (e.g., pride and guilt) and other-oriented (e.g.,
admiration and anger) positive and negative emotions, and
also cultural differences in that whereas Canadian adolescents
found it much more obligatory to refrain from harming than to
engage in helping, this distinction was not as strong for Chinese
adolescents (Krettenauer and Jia, 2013).
The research question to be tested in this paper is whether
or not anticipated guilt if not helping and anticipated warm
glow if helping should be considered two separate constructs
rather than part of a single “mood management” construct in
helping motivation. The research question was arrived to after
reviewing the literature on mood improvement and finding
seemingly contradictory patterns of guilt and warm glow. For
example, while anticipated guilt if not helping is higher in
situations where the victim is important for the helpers well-
being (e.g., more anticipated guilt if not helping a person that
later will allocate money between the two of you; Baumeister
et al., 1995; Nelissen, 2014), positive emotions such as perceived
meaningfulness of helping is higher in situations where helping
involves some personal discomfort (c.f. moral martyrdom;
Olivola and Shafir, 2013), and becomes more important in
helping decisions where people are asked to help with time
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rather than with money (c.f. the time-ask effect, Liu and Aaker,
2008).
If anticipated guilt and anticipated warm glow are tapping
in to the same underlying “mood management-construct,” they
will be similarly influenced by situational factors (e.g., situations
that elicit strong anticipated guilt if not helping will also elicit
strong anticipated warm glow if helping). On the other hand,
if anticipated guilt and anticipated warm glow are measuring
different types of reactions, they will at least sometimes be
differently influenced by situational factors (e.g., situations that
elicit relatively strong guilt if not helping will elicit relatively weak
warm glow if helping and vice versa). In other words, we expect
that a change in the helping situation can increase anticipated
guilt if not helping but at the same time decrease anticipated
warm glow if helping. The next question concerns what types of
situational differences that potentially could influence anticipated
guilt and anticipated warm glow in opposite directions?
HAVING A RESPONSIBILITY TO HELP
As noted above, the studies by Krettenauer and Johnston (2011)
and Krettenauer and Jia (2013) clearly separated positive and
negative reactions and found that they were differently influenced
by proscriptive morality (i.e., do not harm) and prescriptive
morality (i.e., help, Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). However, whereas
their studies focused primarily on the difference between acts
and omissions, our study focuses only on prescriptive morality
(participants imagine their reactions if helping and/or if not
helping), but varies the degree of responsibility to help.
People help more when they believe they have a personal
responsibility to do so than when they do not (Baumeister
et al., 1994; Jeske, 2008; Rai and Fiske, 2011). Batson (2011)
acknowledges that helping can be motivated by moral principles
and that doing ones responsibility is a kind of moral principle. It
has further been shown that although empathic feelings predict
helping, its predictive power drops in magnitude and often loses
significance when controlling for the perceived responsibility to
help (Wilhelm and Bekkers, 2010).
Responsibility and guilt have previously been intimately
connected (Basil et al., 2006; Berndsen and Manstead, 2007;
Gebauer et al., 2008; Zimmermann et al., 2011). Hoffman (1982)
argues that to feel guilt, both empathic distress and some degree
of self-attribution of responsibility for the victim’s suffering are
necessary and Baumeister et al. (1994), suggest that although
perceived responsibility is not a requirement for guilt, it is an
important determinant of the magnitude of experienced guilt.
Guilt mediated helping done by a transgressor (i.e., a person
accepting a causal responsibility) but other factors mediated
helping done by non-transgressors in a study by Regan (1971).
In sum, not helping in a situation where one perceives a
responsibility to help almost always leads to feelings of guilt
whereas not helping in a situation where one does not perceive
a responsibility hardly elicit any guilt at all.
The relation between responsibility and warm glow has not
been as well researched. Still, Weinstein and Ryan (2010) found
that people experience less well-being after helping if the helping
decision is partially outside their own control. In one of their
studies, donating more rather than less money was related to an
improved mood if the helping was autonomous but to a slightly
worsened mood if the helping was controlled. In other words, if
people feel obligated to help (by others or by ones internalized
moral standards), warm glow reactions will be weaker than if
the choice to help is totally up to the helper (see also Dunn
et al., 2014). Likewise, Harbaugh et al. (2007) showed that the
reward-center in the brain is activated when voluntary giving is
performed, but less so when obligatory giving is performed.
Taken together, these results suggest that guilt and warm
glow could be influenced in different ways when manipulating
situational aspects related to personal responsibility. In high-
responsibility situations, people should anticipate feeling strong
guilt if not helping but weak warm glow if helping. On the other
hand, in low-responsibility situations people should anticipate
feeling weak guilt if not helping but strong warm glow if helping.
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDIES
We used four studies to test our hypothesis. The studies were
similar in the sense that all participants read several scenarios
each describing a different hypothetical helping situation. For
each scenario, they were told to imagine themselves in the
role of the potential helper and asked to rate their anticipated
emotions if helping (anticipated warm glow) and/or if not
helping (anticipated guilt). Each helping scenario was written
in at least one high-responsibility version and one low-
responsibility version, and pilot-studies confirmed that the
perceived responsibility to help varied as a function of scenario-
version. The main difference between the four studies was
that the two different factors (type of anticipated emotion and
responsibility-version) were rated and evaluated by participants
either separately or jointly (c.f. General evaluability theory Hsee
and Zhang, 2010).
Different Responsibility-Manipulations
Several situational aspects are known to influence the perceived
responsibility to help, and in order to increase generalizability
we included many types of responsibility-manipulations. In
each included helping-scenario, we manipulated a specific
situational aspect assumed to influence the degree of perceived
responsibility. The situational aspects and scenario-specific
hypotheses are briefly explained below.
Effort
Not only the perceived benefit for the victim but also the
perceived personal cost of helping influences responsibility.
People perceive a high responsibility to help if the helping
behavior is effortless but perceive a low responsibility to help
if the helping behavior is effortful. Effort of helping can be
manipulated by varying the time or energy it would require to
help, or by varying one’s available resources. We predict that
anticipated guilt if not helping will be higher when helping is
relatively effortless (e.g., helping is quick, cheap and done with
money rather than time), but that anticipated warm glow if
helping will be higher when helping is relatively effortful (c.f.
Olivola and Shafir, 2013).
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Cause of Problem
A potential helper who has caused the victim’s need situation
(either by negligence or by mistake) will perceive herself as
more responsible to help compared to if the need situation was
caused by bad luck or by the victim herself. We thus predict that
anticipated guilt if not helping will be higher when the potential
helper caused the problem, but that anticipated warm glow if
helping will be higher when the problem was caused by bad luck
or by the victim1.
Social Closeness
People believe they have a greater responsibility to help
victims that are socially close to them (e.g., relatives, friends,
countrymen) than victims that are socially distant (Baumeister
et al., 1994; Baron et al., 2013; Erlandsson et al., 2015). We thus
predict that anticipated guilt if not helping will be higher when
the person in need is socially close, but that anticipated warm
glow if helping will be higher when the person in need is socially
distant.
Promises, Expectations and Requests
Making a promise entails a responsibility to keep it (Vanberg,
2008), and one reason for this is that promises increase others’
expectations. In fact, even unfounded expectations from others
can increase the perceived responsibility to comply (Baumeister
et al., 1995). Also, an explicit request is an obvious way of
communicating an expectation, suggesting that requests increase
the perceived responsibility to help. We thus predict that
anticipated guilt if not helping will be higher when the victim
expects to be helped (e.g., unfounded expectation, promise-based
expectation or request-based expectation), but that anticipated
warm glow if helping will be higher when the victim does not
expect to be helped.
Bystanders
The traditional explanation for the famous bystander effect
(Fischer et al., 2011) is diffusion of responsibilitymeaning that for
each additional bystander, the responsibility to help is distributed
among many thus reducing one’s personal responsibility (Cryder
and Loewenstein, 2012). We thus predict that anticipated guilt
if not helping will be higher when there are no other potential
helpers, but that anticipated warm glow if helping will be higher
when there are many other potential helpers.
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Participation was anonymous and all participants were informed
beforehand what kind of task they would be doing. They were
also told that they could stop their participation at any time
without explanation. This created an informed consent. The
study was tacitly approved by an in-house ethics committee at
1As noted by one of the reviewers, manipulating the cause of the problem is likely
to influence not only anticipated guilt but also experienced guilt (i.e., a person who
accidently caused harm to someone else could experience guilt because the harm
already made, and also anticipate additional guilt if not helping. As experienced
guilt was not controlled for in these studies, we cannot say to what extent it
influenced the results. Results if removing the cause of problem-scenarios can be
found in Appendix 2.
the Department of Psychology at LundUniversity but because the
informed consent, because the hypothetical and non-intrusive
nature of the study and because participants were over 18
years old, no formal ethics committee were required to review
the study.
STUDY 1
Study 1 was conducted to test if anticipated guilt if not helping
and anticipated warm glow if helping are similarly or differently
influenced when manipulating responsibility in several different
ways. Two separate studies were conducted (Study 1a and
Study 1b). The methodology of the studies was identical but
the included situations and type of responsibility-manipulations
differed. Participants were told that their task was to read
and imagine six hypothetical scenarios presented on separate
pages, and to respond to the questions following each scenario.
Each participant read three scenarios written in the high-
responsibility version and three scenarios written in the low-
responsibility version. Half of the participants were asked to rate
their anticipated guilt if not helping in each scenario. The other
half was asked to rate their anticipated warm glow if helping
in each scenario. Thus, both type of anticipated emotion and
responsibility-version was evaluated separately in Study 1.
STUDY 1A
Method
One-hundred eighty six Swedish students participated by filling
out a paper and pen questionnaire. Fifteen participants were
excluded formissingmore than one question in the questionnaire
or for talking to other people during participation2. The
remaining participants (83 female, 78 male, and 10 unknown)
had a mean age of 22.02 years (SD= 3.09).
The first manipulation concerned type of anticipated emotion
and was measured between-groups. Half of the participants were
asked to imagine how they would feel if they did not help in
each situation and to respond to three questions measuring their
anticipated guilt if not helping: 1. I would feel guilty if I did not
help, 2. I would have a bad conscience if I did not help, and 3.
I would feel regret if I did not help (all Crombach’s α’s > 0.89).
The other half were asked to imagine how they would feel if
they actually helped in each situation and to respond to three
questions measuring their anticipated warm glow if helping: 1.
I would experience a warm pleasurable feeling if I helped, 2. I
would feel satisfied if I helped, and 3. I would feel that I did
something very nice if I helped (all Crombach’s α’s> 0.73). These
ratings were done on seven-point Likert-scales where 0 = not at
all and 6 = very much.
2After receiving the completed questionnaires in Study 1, the experimenter (AJ)
discretely marked those where she believed the participant had openly discussed
the questionnaire with others or where the participant seemed to fill in the
questions in a haphazard manner. Importantly, the experimenter was unaware of
any of the responses of the excluded participants when doing this. Exclusion was
equally common in the anticipated guilt and anticipated warm glow conditions.
Including the excluded participants did increase noise, but the results remained
largely unchanged in all studies.
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The second manipulation concerned degree of responsibility
to help. Six helping-scenarios were written in one
high-responsibility version and one low-responsibility
version and each participant read three scenarios written in
a high-responsibility version and three scenarios written in a
low-responsibility version, but never both versions of the same
scenario. The order of the scenarios and the version-order
combinations were balanced in twelve different ways.
A pilot-study done on a separate sample after the main
study (N = 101), confirmed that the perceived personal
responsibility to help was significantly higher in the high-
responsibility version than in the low-responsibility version in
four scenarios and directionally but non-significantly higher in
the high-responsibility version for the bystanders-scenario. One
of the included scenarios did not pass the manipulation check
so this scenario is not included in the analyses3. See Table 1
for a summary of the included scenarios and their respective
high-/low-responsibility versions, and see Appendix 1 for all
scenarios in full-text.
Results
Each participant’s anticipated emotion for the high-responsibility
versions and for the low-responsibility versions were aggregated.
We then conducted a 2 × 2 Mixed ANOVA where type of
anticipated emotion (anticipated guilt if not helping/anticipated
warm glow if helping) was a between-group factor and
responsibility level (high-/low-responsibility version) was a
within-subject factor. The interaction was significant, F(1, 169) =
26.91, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.137, indicating that anticipated guilt if
not helping and anticipated warm glow if helping are differently
influenced by the responsibility manipulations4. Planned t-tests
showed that whereas anticipated guilt was clearly higher in the
high-responsibility versions (M = 3.57, SD = 1.03) than in the
low-responsibility versions [M = 2.61, SD = 1.16; t(84) = 5.93, p
< 0.001, Cohen’s d= 0.80], anticipated warm glow was similar in
the high-responsibility versions (M = 3.96, SD= 0.92) and in the
low-responsibility versions [M = 3.97, SD = 0.78; t(85) = −0.03,
p = 0.978]. This indicates that people anticipate feeling much
more guilt if not helping in high-responsibility situations than in
low-responsibility situations but that the anticipated warm glow
if helping is not influenced by the responsibility manipulation.
Looking at the five situations separately gives a similar
picture (see Figure 1). The expected anticipated emotion type
× responsibility version interaction was significant in four
scenarios, and close to significance in one scenario5. Anticipated
guilt was significantly higher in the high-responsibility version
3In one scenario (existence of a social norm), the perceived responsibility to help
was directionally smaller in the high-responsibility version (i.e., more than 90% of
your co-workers donated one days salary to charity) than in the low-responsibility
version (i.e., less than 5% of your co-workers donated one days salary to charity).
This scenario was therefore not included in the main study analysis. A more
detailed description of the pilot studies can be found in Appendix 2.
4In order to avoid making a long article even longer, only the interaction effects are
reported in the main text. Inferential statistics of the accompanying main effects
can be found in Appendix 2.
5Expectation, F(1, 167) = 5.11, p = 0.025, η
2
= 0.030; Effort, F(1, 167) = 8.59,
p = 0.004, η2 = 0.049; Request, F(1, 167) = 3.40, p = 0.067, η
2
= 0.020; Closeness,
F(1, 167) = 8.54, p = 0.004, η
2
= 0.049; Bystander, F(1, 167) = 5.74, p = 0.018,
η
2
= 0.033.
than in the low-responsibility version for all scenarios but
anticipated warm glow never significantly differed when
comparing the high- and low-responsibility versions (see
Table 2).
STUDY 1B
Method
One-hundred eighty Swedish students participated but 10 were
excluded for the same reasons as in Study 1a. The remaining 170
participants (76 female, 86 male, 8 unknown) had a mean age of
22.69 years (SD = 2.92). The procedure and conducted analyses
was identical to Study 1a but the six scenarios and responsibility
manipulations were different.
A pilot-study done on a separate sample after the main study
(N = 108), confirmed that the perceived personal responsibility
to help was significantly higher in the high-responsibility version
than in the low-responsibility version in five scenarios6. See
Table 1 for a summary of all the included scenarios and their
respective high-/low-responsibility versions.
Results
The interaction was significant, F(1, 168) = 50.65, p < 0.001,
η
2
= 0.232, indicating that anticipated guilt if not helping
(α’s in the different scenarios ranging from 0.88 to 0.94) and
anticipated warm glow if helping (α’s ranging from 0.77 to 0.91)
were differently influenced by the responsibility manipulations.
Planned t-tests showed that anticipated guilt if not helping was
clearly higher in the high-responsibility versions (M = 3.79,
SD = 1.34) than in the low-responsibility versions [M = 2.50,
SD= 1.30; t(87) = 9.17, p< 0.001, d = 0.98], but that anticipated
warm glow if helping was similar in the high-responsibility
versions (M = 3.95, SD = 1.00) and in the low-responsibility
versions [M = 3.88, SD = 1.05; t(81) = 0.77, p = 0.444]. This
again indicates that people anticipate feeling much more guilt
if not helping in high-responsibility situations than in low-
responsibility situations but that the anticipated warm glow if
helping is not influenced by the responsibility manipulations.
Looking at the five situations separately gives a similar
picture (see Figure 2). The expected anticipated emotion-type
× responsibility-version interaction was significant in four
scenarios and close to significant in one scenario7. Anticipated
guilt was significantly higher in the high-responsibility version
than in the low-responsibility version for all scenarios but
anticipated warm glow never significantly differed when
comparing the high- and low-responsibility versions (see
Table 2).
6In one scenario describing two boys going door to door to sell magazines, the
perceived responsibility to help was directionally smaller in the presumed high-
responsibility version (i.e., the boys have hardly sold anything yet) than in the
presumed low responsibility version (the boys only need to sell two more until
they have reached their goal). This scenario was therefore not included in the
main study analysis. A detailed description of the pilot-study can be found in
Appendix 2.
7Type of helping, F(1, 166) = 4.35, p= 0.039, η
2
= 0.026; Resources, F(1, 166) = 3.47,
p = 0.064, η2 = 0.020; Cause (Money), F(1, 166) = 10.10, p = 0.002, η
2
= 0.057;
Promise, F(1, 166) = 25.77, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.134; Cause (Time), F(1, 166) = 5.12,
p= 0.025, η2 = 0.030.
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TABLE 1 | Summary of the included scenarios in Studies 1a (first five scenarios) and 1b (last five scenarios).
Scenario name Context High- responsibility version Low-responsibility version Type of helping
Expectation Your grandmother who loved volunteering
recently died
Expectation: You know that your
grandmother expected you to
start volunteering.
No expectation: You know that
your grandmother expected you
to follow your own heart.
Signing up to volunteer at a soup
kitchen
Effort You read that there is currently a short
supply of your blood type.
Small effort: To donate blood
would not take a lot of effort from
your part (30 min)
Big effort: To donate blood
would take a lot of effort from
your part (8 h)
Donating blood
Request You meet a foreign man at the train-station
who missed the last bus to his destination
due to no mistake of his own
Request: The foreign man gets
anxious and explicitly ask you if
you can pay for a taxi
No request: The foreign man
does not ask you for anything
Paying a taxi for the man
Social Closeness You ride on a bus on the way to your work.
While riding, you see a young woman sitting
on a bench crying hard.
Relative: The young woman is
your cousin
Stranger: The young woman is
someone you recognize from
your local supermarket but have
never spoken to
Jumping of the bus to see if you
can help the girl (implying that
you will be late for work)
Bystanders You are in a hurry and bike through a park.
You see a boy fall from a jungle gym. The
boy has a nosebleed and cry heavily
No bystanders: No one expect
yourself are close to the incident
Bystanders: In the distance,
there is a group of other adults
who soon will notice that the boy
is injured
Stopping the bike to help the boy
(implying that you will not arrive
in time)
Type of helping You see a friendly but very poor older man
drop and lose some bills in the wind when
entering the supermarket to buy food. He
gets very sad
Helping with money: You
consider helping by giving him
some bills.
Helping with time: You consider
helping by inviting him for dinner
Give him bills/invite him for dinner
Resources You just won some money on a lottery. Later
the same day you are approached by a
fund-raiser from Red Cross asking you for a
one time donation of 300SEK.
Big resources: You won a lot of
money on the lottery (50.000
SEK)
Small resources: You won a
small sum of money on the
lottery (500 SEK)
Making a one-time donation of
300SEK
Cause (Money) A woman at your job forgot her purse at
work and the next day it was stolen by
someone who entered the building. The
woman lost a lot of money and it is
approaching Christmas
Your fault: The thief entered the
building through a window that
you forgot to close
Victims fault: The thief entered
the building through a window
that the woman forgot to close
Lending the woman 5000SEK
and paying her insurance deposit
Promise You talk to an acquaintance at a party. The
acquaintance will move to another city some
weeks later and worries about carrying
heavy stuff in stairs.
Promise made: At the party, you
promised the acquaintance that
you will help her moving
No promise made: At the party,
you said that you were sorry but
that you could not help her
moving
Accepting to help her moving
when she creates a Facebook
event about it several weeks later
Cause (Time) You are on your way to a movie-premiere
when you collide with another car with two
seniors. No one is injured but their car has a
damaged suspension. They need to go to
the airport but cannot get hold of a taxi.
Your fault: The crash was clearly
your fault
Victims fault: The crash was
clearly their fault
Driving them to the airport in
your car (hence missing the
movie-premiere)
STUDY 2
Whereas participants in Study 1 rated either only their
anticipated guilt or only their anticipated warm glow,
participants in Study 2 were told to imagine both helping
and not helping and asked to rate both their anticipated guilt
(if not helping) and their anticipated warm glow (if helping). In
addition, whereas Study 1 included items measuring primarily
the emotional aspects of anticipated guilt and anticipated warm
glow, Study 2 measured guilt and warm glow both as anticipated
self-directed emotions (i.e., how would you feel if helping/not
helping) and in terms of anticipated self-image (i.e., what would
you think about yourself if helping/not helping). Half of the
participants in Study 2 thus rated their anticipated emotional
guilt if not helping and anticipated emotional warm glow if
helping whereas the other half rated their anticipated self-image
guilt if not helping and their anticipated self-image warm glow if
helping.
Method
Swedish speaking participants were recruited on social media
and asked to participate in an online survey. Two-hundred
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FIGURE 1 | Anticipated guilt if not helping and anticipated warm glow if helping in the five scenarios included in Study 1a.
TABLE 2 | Mean anticipated guilt and mean anticipated warm glow for each scenario in Study 1a (first five scenarios) and Study 1b (last five scenarios).
Scenario name Anticipated guilt if not helping Anticipated warm glow if helping
High- responsibility
version
Low- responsibility version p High- responsibility
version
Low- responsibility
version
p
Expectation 3.10 (1.62) 2.33 (1.76) 0.041 3.63 (1.32) 3.90 (1.20) 0.328
Effort 3.11 (1.50) 2.32 (1.56) 0.019 4.16 (1.13) 4.55 (1.03) 0.096
Request 3.55 (1.39) 2.78 (1.55) 0.019 3.84 (1.32) 3.84 (1.14) 1.00
Social Closeness 3.77 (1.27) 2.34 (1.46) 0.000 3.69 (1.10) 3.41 (1.28) 0.282
Bystanders 4.37 (1.33) 3.19 (1.60) 0.000 4.37 (1.03) 4.11 (0.96) 0.230
Type of helping 3.81 (1.59) 2.74 (1.63) 0.002 4.41 (1.21) 4.24 (1.14) 0.533
Resources 3.34 (1.82) 2.49 (1.61) 0.022 3.61 (1.41) 3.70 (1.73) 0.799
Cause (Money) 4.05 (1.75) 2.99 (1.58) 0.004 3.94 (1.29) 4.28 (0.92) 0.179
Promise 3.70 (1.38) 1.57 (1.25) 0.000 3.67 (1.28) 3.46 (0.95) 0.408
Cause (Time) 4.05 (1.50) 2.80 (1.62) 0.000 4.04 (1.30) 3.82 (1.50) 0.481
fifteen participants began filling out the online questionnaire
and 194 completed it. Participants first read a brief description
of anticipated guilt and anticipated warm glow and asked if
they could understand these concepts. Two participants who
did not understand the concept of anticipated guilt if not
helping were excluded from the analysis. 116 female, 67 male,
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FIGURE 2 | Anticipated guilt if not helping and anticipated warm glow if helping in the five scenarios included in Study 1b.
and 9 with unclassified sex were included (Mage = 31.69
years, SD= 9.93).
All participants read four helping scenarios used in Study
1 (Expectation, Effort, Cause[Money] and Request). Each
participant read two scenarios in the high-responsibility version
and the other two scenarios in the low-responsibility version. A
scenario written in a high-responsibility version always followed
a scenario written in the low-responsibility version and the other
way around. Half of the participants read the scenarios in the
order of (1) Expectation, (2) Effort, (3) Cause, and (4) Request,
and the other half read the scenarios in the opposite order.
After each scenario, participants rated both anticipated guilt if
not helping and anticipated warm glow if helping. Approximately
half of the participants were asked two questions about the
emotional type of anticipated guilt (“I would feel guilty if I did not
help” and “I would feel a bad conscience if I did not help”) and the
emotional type of anticipated warm glow (“I would feel a warm
sense of well-being if I helped” and “I would feel very satisfied if I
helped”). The other half were instead asked about the self-image
type of anticipated guilt if not helping (“I would see myself as a
terrible person if I did not help” and “I would perceive myself to
have done something immoral if I did not help”) and the self-image
type of anticipated warm glow if helping (“I would perceive myself
as an unusually good person if I helped” and “I would feel that I had
done something very nice if I helped”). All participants were first
asked to imagine not helping and then asked to imagine helping.
Ratings were done on seven-point Likert-scales where 1 = not at
all and 7= very much.
After reading the four scenarios and answering the four
questions after each scenario, participants stated their sex, their
current age and had the chance to write any comments, including
if they had guessed the hypothesis.
Results
We aggregated all four scenarios in order to test the hypothesis
that anticipated guilt and anticipated warm glow are differently
influenced by the responsibility manipulation. We conducted
a 2 × 2 × 2 Mixed ANOVA. The first factor was type
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of reaction (anticipated guilt if not helping/anticipated warm
glow if helping) measured within subjects. The second factor
was scenario version (high/low responsibility) measured within
subjects. The third factor was whether the anticipated reactions
were emotional or related to self-image (measured between
groups).
As expected, the type of reaction × responsibility-version
interaction was significant, F(1, 190) = 57.49, p < 0.001, η
2
=
0.232, indicating that anticipated guilt and anticipatedwarm glow
are differently influenced by the responsibility manipulation.
The three-way interaction was not significant, F(1, 190) = 2.26,
p = 0.134, indicating that the type of reaction × responsibility
version interaction does not change dramatically if one measures
anticipated feelings (emotional) or anticipated thoughts about
oneself (self-image). We therefore aggregated emotional and
self-image guilt into a single anticipated guilt variable and
emotional and self-image warm glow into a single anticipated
warm glow variable, and used planned t-tests to examine if
these variables were influenced differently by the responsibility
manipulation. As expected, anticipated guilt was higher in the
high-responsibility versions (M = 4.18, SD = 1.45) than in
the low-responsibility versions [M = 3.44, SD = 1.44; t(191)
= 7.34, p < 0.001, d = 0.53]. In contrast, anticipated warm
glow was lower in the high-responsibility versions (M = 4.94,
SD = 1.31) than in the low-responsibility versions [M = 5.18,
SD = 1.26; t(191) = −3.01, p = 0.003, d = 0.22]. These
results give further support to the idea that anticipated guilt
if not helping and anticipated warm glow if helping are two
different constructs, and shows that the two types of motivation
can be affected in opposite directions when manipulating
responsibility.
We also investigated each scenario separately using the same 2
× 2× 2mixed ANOVA. The expected type of reaction× scenario
version two-way interaction was significant for all scenarios8 (see
Figure 3). The three-way interaction was not significant (all F’s
< 1.3) for any of the scenarios and we therefore aggregated
emotional and self-image guilt, and emotional and self-image
warm glow. As can be seen in Table 3, whereas anticipated guilt
was significantly higher in the high-responsibility than in the low-
responsibility version in all four scenarios, anticipated warm glow
was significantly lower in the high-responsibility version in the
cause-scenario and marginally so in the effort-scenario.
STUDY 3
Whereas participants in the first studies read either a high-
responsibility version or a low-responsibility version of each
scenario, participants in Study 3 read five versions of each
scenario. The five versions were presented so that responsibility
decreased in each step. For each version, participants either rated
their anticipated guilt if not helping or their anticipated warm
glow if helping. As perceived responsibility to help became lower
for each version, we expected anticipated guilt to decrease linearly
but expected anticipated warm glow to increase linearly.
Method
One-hundred eighteen prospective university students
participated. 13 of these were removed from the analysis
because they either did not complete the questionnaire, because
8Expectation, F(1, 187) = 7.29, p = 0.008, η
2
= 0.038; Effort, F(1, 187) = 11.28,
p = 0.001, η2 = 0.057; Cause, F(1, 186) = 40.04, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.177; Request,
F(1, 186) = 3.96, p= 0.048, η
2
= 0.021.
FIGURE 3 | Anticipated guilt if not helping and anticipated warm glow if helping in the four scenarios included in Study 2.
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TABLE 3 | Mean anticipated guilt if not helping and mean anticipated warm glow if helping for each scenario in Study 2.
Anticipated Guilt if not helping Anticipated Warm Glow if helping
High- responsibility
version
Low- responsibility
version
p High- responsibility
version
Low- responsibility
version
p
Expectation 3.80 (1.79) 3.22 (1.78) 0.024 4.71 (1.56) 4.71 (1.51) 0.980
Effort 3.37 (1.69) 2.81 (1.56) 0.018 4.73 (1.64) 5.16 (1.56) 0.068
Cause 5.13 (1.70) 3.89 (1.60) 0.000 4.49 (1.76) 4.87 (1.64) 0.013
Request 4.47 (1.51) 3.84 (1.68) 0.007 5.39 (1.29) 5.43 (1.42) 0.853
they were under-aged or because they correctly guessed the
hypothesis. The remaining 105 participants (67 women and 38
men) had a mean age of 22.11 years (SD = 8.62). Participants
were recruited individually at a university fair and asked to
complete a paper and pen questionnaire. They were told that
the participation was anonymous and that they were going to be
compensated with a lottery ticket worth 10 SEK for participating
(≈ $1.2). All participants claimed to understand the concepts of
anticipated guilt and anticipated warm glow.
All participants read four helping scenarios. Each scenario
came with five different possible alternative endings (see Table 4
for summaries and Appendix 1 for full-text). Half of the
participants were asked to imagine themselves not helping and to
rate their anticipated guilt for each of the five alternative endings.
The other half were asked to imagine actually helping and to
rate their anticipated warm glow for each of the five alternative
endings.
The four scenarios were presented to participants on separate
pages in a balanced order. The layout for each scenario was
that participants read a background-story and five alternative
endings labeled a (the high-responsibility version) to e (the low-
responsibility version)9. After each alternative ending, half of
the participants were asked to rate their anticipated guilt if not
helping in that specific circumstance whereas the other half
were asked to rate their anticipated warm glow if helping in
that specific circumstance. Responses were made on a Likert-
scale ranging from 0 (none at all) to 10 = (extremely strong).
After reading and responding to all five alternative endings of
all four scenarios, participants read everything once again. This
time around they were asked how probable it was that they
would help for each alternative ending in all scenarios, with
probability to help ranging from 0 (“Not probable at all”) to 10
(“Very probable”). This represented a crude measure of helping
intention but as focus was on different types of anticipated
emotions, the results relating to self-reported helping intentions
are reported in Appendix 2.
Results
For each scenario, we first tested if the two linear trends of
anticipated guilt and of anticipated warm glow were different
when varying responsibility over the five alternative endings.
To do this, we conducted trend analyses with a mixed 5 ×
9Two small pilot studies were conducted prior to the main analysis in order
to obtain five versions that together created strong linear effects on perceived
responsibility for each scenario.
2 ANOVA where the five alternative endings were measured
within subjects and type of reaction (anticipated guilt if
not helping/anticipated warm glow if helping) was measured
between groups. It was expected that anticipated guilt and
anticipated warm glow would be differently affected by the
responsibility manipulation. We then investigated the linear
trends of anticipated guilt and anticipated warm glow separately.
It was expected that anticipated guilt would decrease linearly
as the responsibility got lower in each alternative ending, but
that anticipated warm glow would increase linearly as the
responsibility got lower in each alternative ending. Because
the obtained pattern differed substantially between the helping
scenarios, each scenario is analyzed and reported separately in
this study.
Effort Scenario
The interaction effect between the two linear trends of anticipated
guilt and of anticipated warm glow whilst varying amount of
effort was clearly significant: F(1, 103) = 162.43, p < 0.001,
η
2
= 0.61, see Figure 4. The linear trend of anticipated guilt was
clearly significant, F(1, 49) = 377.78, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.89, and,
as expected, people anticipated more guilt if not helping when
the amount of effort to help was small than when the amount of
effort to help was big. The linear trend of anticipated warm glow
was also significant, F(1, 54) = 19.78, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.27, but
in the opposite direction. As expected, participants anticipated
more warm glow if helping when the amount of effort to help
was big than when the amount of effort to help was small.
Victim’s Fault Scenario
No significant interaction effect between the two linear trends
of anticipated guilt and of anticipated warm glow whilst varying
the degree of victim’s fault was found: F(1, 103) = 3.47, p =
0.07, η2 = 0.03, see Figure 4. This suggests that anticipated
guilt if not helping and anticipated warm glow if helping are
similarly influenced by the victim’s fault manipulation. The linear
trend of anticipated guilt was clearly significant F(1, 49) = 301.08,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.86, suggesting that people anticipate more
guilt if not helping when the victim was totally innocent than
when the victim caused her own problem. Against expectations,
anticipated warm glow did not go in the opposite direction. In
fact, people anticipated more warm glow if helping when the
victim was totally innocent than when the victim caused her own
problem, F(1, 54) = 157.98, p< 0.001, η
2
= 0.75.We try to explain
this unexpected result in the discussion section.
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FIGURE 4 | Mean anticipated guilt if not helping and mean anticipated warm glow if helping in each of the alternative endings in the four scenarios in
Study 3. (a), Highest responsibility version; (e), Lowest responsibility version.
Bystander Scenario
The interaction effect between the two linear trends of anticipated
guilt and of anticipated warm glow whilst varying number
and eligibility of bystanders was clearly significant, F(1, 103) =
109.64, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.52, see Figure 4. The linear trend
of anticipated guilt was clearly significant, F(1, 49) = 489.88,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.91, indicating that people anticipate more
guilt if not helping when there are no bystanders than if not
helping when there are many eligible bystanders. The linear trend
of anticipated warm glow was not significant, F(1, 54) = 2.03,
p = 0.16, η2 = 0.04, indicating that people anticipate similar
amounts of warm glow when helping alone as when helping in
the presence of eligible bystanders.
Closeness Scenario
The interaction effect between the two linear trends of anticipated
guilt and of anticipated warm glow whilst varying social closeness
was clearly significant, F(1, 103) = 114.71, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.53,
see Figure 4. The linear trend of anticipated guilt was clearly
significant, F(1, 49) = 208.75, p< 0.001, η
2
= 0.81, indicating that
people anticipate much more guilt if not helping when the victim
is someone socially close than if the victim is someone socially
distant. The linear trend of anticipated warm glow was in the
opposite direction but not significant, F(1, 54) = 2.58, p = 0.11,
η
2
= 0.05, indicating that people anticipate similar amounts of
warm glow when helping in the absence and in the presence of
eligible bystanders.
STUDY 4
The aim of Study 4 was to replicate Study 3 but letting
all participants rate both anticipated guilt if not helping and
anticipated warm glow if helping for each alternative ending. In
addition, we changed the Victim’s fault scenario in Study 3 into a
scenario where the target of fault for the situation went from the
victim’s fault via nobody’s fault to the potential helpers fault.
Method
The participants were 110 university students (81 women, 28
men, and 1 other) recruited around the university campus
(Mage = 23.73 years, SD = 4.91). The procedure and materials
were similar to those used in Study 3, but with the following
changes: First and most importantly, anticipated guilt and
anticipated warm glow were measured within subjects. Hence,
for each alternative ending in each scenario, participants rated
their anticipated guilt if not helping, their anticipated warm
glow if helping and their self-rated probability to help on the
same page. The order of presentation of the anticipated guilt
and anticipated warm glow questions were balanced. Second, we
changed the presentation-order of alternative endings to range
from a (low responsibility) to e (high responsibility); i.e., the
opposite order from Study 3. Third, the Victim’s fault scenario
in Study 3 was changed into a more general Fault scenario in
Study 4 where the alternative endings ranged from a (problem
was clearly accidentally caused by the victim) via c (nobody’s
caused the problem) to e (problem was clearly accidently caused
by the potential helper; see Table 4 and Appendix 1).
Results
The conducted analyses were identical to the analyses described
in Study 3, with the exception that type of anticipated emotions
was measured within subjects rather than between groups. Each
helping scenario is again reported separately.
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Effort Scenario
The interaction effect between the two linear trends of anticipated
guilt and of anticipated warm glow whilst varying the amount
of effort was clearly significant, F(1, 109) = 316.69, p < 0.001,
η
2
= 0.74, see Figure 5. The linear trend of anticipated guilt was
significant F(1, 109) = 368.66, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.77, showing that
people anticipate more guilt if not helping when the effort to help
is small than when the effort to help is big. The linear trend of
anticipated warm glow was also significant but in the opposite
direction, F(1, 109) = 57.65, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.35, indicating that
people anticipate more warm glow if helping when the effort to
help is big than if helping when the effort to help is small.
Fault Scenario
The interaction effect between the two linear trends of anticipated
guilt and of anticipated warm glow whilst varying who caused
the problem was clearly significant, F(1, 105) = 216.06, p < 0.001,
η
2
= 0.67, see Figure 5. The linear trend of anticipated guilt was
significant F(1, 106) = 462.59, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.81, showing that
people anticipate more guilt if not helping when they caused the
problem than if the victim caused the problem. The linear trend
of anticipated warm glow was also significant but in the opposite
direction, F(1, 105) = 14.11, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.12, indicating that
people anticipate more warm glow if helping when nobody or the
victim caused the problem than if helping when they caused the
problem.
Bystander Scenario
The interaction effect between the two linear trends of anticipated
guilt and of anticipated warm glow whilst varying number and
eligibility of bystanders was clearly significant, F(1, 109) = 157.54,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.59, see Figure 5. This suggests that anticipated
guilt if not helping and anticipated warm glow if helping
are differently influenced by the bystander-manipulation. As
expected, the linear trend of anticipated guilt was significant
F(1, 109) = 457.09, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.81, showing that people
anticipate more guilt if not helping when there are no bystanders
than if not helping when there are many eligible bystanders.
Against expectations, the linear trend of anticipated warm glow
was significant in the same direction, F(1, 109) = 56.72, p< 0.001,
η
2
= 0.34, indicating that people anticipate more warm glow if
helping when there are no bystanders than if helping when there
are many bystanders. We try to explain this unexpected result in
the general discussion.
Closeness Scenario
The interaction effect between the two linear trends of anticipated
guilt and of anticipated warm glow whilst varying social closeness
of the victim was clearly significant, F(1, 107) = 315.79, p< 0.001,
η
2
= 0.75, see Figure 5. The linear trend of anticipated guilt
was significant F(1, 108) = 727.95, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.87, showing
that people anticipate more guilt if not helping when the victim
is socially close than when the victim is socially distant. The
linear trend of anticipated warm glow was also significant but
in the opposite direction, F(1, 107) = 6.40, p = 0.013, η
2
= 0.06,
indicating that people anticipate slightly more warm glow when
helping someone socially distant than when helping someone
socially close.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study has demonstrated that anticipated guilt if not
helping and anticipated warm glow if helping should be
considered two different constructs rather than part of a single
“mood maintenance” or “feeling better” construct when testing
FIGURE 5 | Mean anticipated guilt if not helping and mean anticipated warm glow if helping in each of the alternative endings in the four scenarios in
Study 4. (a), Lowest responsibility version; (e), highest responsibility version.
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motivations of prosocial behavior. We did this by showing that
anticipated guilt and anticipated warm glow were differently
influenced when manipulating situational factors related to
personal responsibility to help.
The four studies essentially tested the same thing but with
different combinations of separate and joint evaluation of the
two manipulations. Study 1 included 10 different responsibility-
manipulations in order to give a broader understanding of how
the anticipated emotions are influenced by various situational
aspects. The expected interaction effect was significant or
marginally significant for all 10 responsibility-manipulations. In
Study 2 (where participants rated both types of reactions) guilt
was significantly higher and warm glow significantly lower in
the high-responsibility versions, hence suggesting that situational
differences can influence anticipated guilt and anticipated warm
glow in opposite directions. Study 3 and Study 4 manipulated
personal responsibility in degrees within subjects rather than
dichotomously between groups. Results differed depending of
the type of responsibility manipulation used, but the expected
pattern (i.e., compared to low-responsibility versions, high-
responsibility versions elicit stronger anticipated guilt but
weaker anticipated warm glow) emerged at least for the effort-
manipulation, social closeness-manipulation and cause/fault-
manipulation.
At the very least, these results imply that one cannot infer
a person’s anticipated warm glow if helping from knowing her
anticipated guilt if not helping or the other way around. A specific
helping situation can surely elicit both strong anticipated guilt
if not helping and strong anticipated warm glow if helping, but
our findings suggest that one can also imagine situations where
anticipated guilt if not helping is relatively strong but anticipated
warm glow if helping is relatively weak or vice versa.
Discussion of the Unexpected Findings
We tested the hypotheses in five separate studies, and in each of
them we included several types of responsibility-manipulations.
For the most part, the results point in the same direction and
support our idea that responsibility manipulations influence
anticipated guilt and anticipated warm glow in different ways.
Still, some unexpected findings emerged and these warrant
further elaboration.
Separate or Joint Evaluations of Anticipated Guilt
and Anticipated Warm Glow
According to the General evaluability theory (Hsee and Zhang,
2010) our responses to a specific situation can vary a lot
depending on if we evaluate only that situation (separate
evaluation) or also another situation (joint evaluation). In
this study, the hypothesis was tested using separate and
joint evaluation of both responsibility-versions and of type of
anticipated reaction. Both separate and joint evaluation comes
with their respective inherent benefits and problems, so the fact
that we found at least partial support for our hypotheses in all
four studies strengthens the results of this study.
However, as we expected stronger anticipated warm glow
in low-responsibility situations than in high-responsibility
situations, it was unexpected to see that the responsibility-
manipulation never influenced anticipated warm glow in Study
1 (and only for two of the scenarios in Study 3). One explanation
of this finding is straightforward—that situational manipulations
of responsibility influence anticipated guilt ratings but leave
anticipated warm glow unaffected. Speculatively, this might not
be limited to responsibility-manipulations specifically, but rather
illustrate a general pattern that anticipated guilt is more context-
dependent whereas anticipated warm glow is first and foremost
dependent on individual differences.
Another explanation for the unaffected warm glow-ratings in
Studies 1 and 3 is that some participants who were responding
to the question about anticipated warm glow if helping, to
some extent included anticipation of negative emotions if not
helping in their responses (because it was not emphasized that
they should focus exclusively on emotions if helping). If so, a
positive effect of anticipated warm glow and a negative effect of
anticipated guilt could nullify each other and create a flat line.
In Studies 2 and 4, participants were asked both about their
anticipated guilt if not helping and their anticipated warm glow if
helping, thus making it much easier to distinguish the two types
of anticipated reactions. This time, anticipated warm glow was
indeed significantly affected by the responsibility-manipulation
in the opposite direction. This indicates that the anticipated
warm glow ratings in Studies 1 and 3, to some extent, could
have been neutralized by participants also considering their
anticipated guilt if not helping.
The Cause Manipulation in Study 3
As predicted, anticipated guilt if not helping was always highest
in situations where the potential helper had caused the need
situation, and lowest in situations where the victim had caused
the problem. When it comes to anticipated warm glow if helping,
the result in Study 3 sticks out as confusing and at odds both with
the hypothesis and with the results from the other studies in this
article. Whereas, anticipated warm glow if helping was higher in
the low-responsibility situation than in the high-responsibility
situation in Study 1b and Study 2, the results from Study 3
showed a different pattern where anticipated warm glow was
influenced in a similar way as anticipated guilt (highest when
the problem was nobody’s fault). We suggest that this pattern
was due to two characteristics of the specific helping scenario
used in Study 3. The victim in this scenario had lost her bike
and the alternative endings ranged from the victim being totally
innocent (having the bike stolen despite multiple precautions)
to the victim causing the situation (throwing the bike from a
balcony). This manipulation differed from the other included
cause-manipulations first in that the manipulation ranged from
nobody’s fault to the victims fault thus not including any version
where the potential helper caused the problem, and second, that
the victim had caused her own problem by an intentional act
(throwing a bike from a balcony) rather than by accident (e.g.,
forgetting to close a window or forgetting to close a door). We
argue that although a small or non-existent responsibility to help
in general imply more anticipated warm glow if helping, there
are other factors that can influence the anticipated warm glow
as well. For example, a sense of being exploited or a belief that
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 15 September 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1475
Erlandsson et al. Anticipated Guilt and Anticipated Warm Glow
one encourages negative behavior by helping is likely to cause
anger and anger is most probably detrimental for warm glow.
Although not measured in this study, it is reasonable to assume
that people felt angry rather than sorry for the victim who caused
her situation due to very reckless behavior but sorry rather than
angry for the victim who caused her problem due to an honest
mistake. Because we realized the inherent problems with the
cause-manipulation in Study 3, we changed this scenario in Study
4 into a scenario similar to the one used in Studies 1b and 2,
where the victim had caused the problem unintentionally and
where the alternative endings ranged from clearly the victims
fault to clearly the potential helpers fault with nobody’s fault in
the middle. The emerging pattern was in line with Studies 1b and
2 meaning that anticipated warm glow if helping was the lowest
when the problem was caused by the potential helper. However,
anticipated warm glow did not change if the problem was caused
unintentionally by the victim or by chance, again suggesting that
there might be other factors than only the level of perceived
responsibility that influence anticipated warm glow.
The Bystander Manipulation
As predicted, the bystander manipulation clearly influenced
anticipated guilt in all studiesmeaning that anticipated guilt if not
helping was higher in situations where one is the only possible
helper. Against our expectations (but in line with a prediction
by Andreoni, 1995, p. 13), the bystander manipulation did not
influence anticipated warm glow in the opposite direction. In
Study 1a and 3, anticipated warm glow was not significantly
affected by the presence of other helpers and in Study 4,
anticipated warm glow was affected in the same direction as
anticipated guilt (i.e., more anticipated warm glow if one is the
only possible helper). One possible explanation comes from a
study about “the embarrassed bystander” where it is suggested
that embarrassment can act as an inhibitor to the decision to
help in social situations (Zoccola et al., 2011). In this regard, it
is again possible to assume that although a non-existent personal
responsibility to help in general imply much anticipated warm
glow if helping, other factors such as embarrassment can decrease
anticipated warm glow (see Tangney and Tracy, 2012). If a
potential helper doubts her own capabilities, helping a victim in
front of others can be a more stressful and unpleasant event for
her, as her actions will likely be evaluated by the bystanders.
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
The primary aim of this study was to show that anticipation
of positive emotions if helping is not the same as anticipation
of negative emotions if not helping. It is possible to anticipate
feeling very bad after not helping but simultaneously anticipate
no positive feelings after helping or vice versa. Both anticipated
guilt and anticipated warm glow have been included in previous
studies and shown to motivate actual helping, but up until
now the two types of motivation have rarely been properly
distinguished and investigated side by side in the literature
about helping decisions. Some researchers have in fact included
both the approaching of warm glow and the avoidance of
guilt as motivations for helping, but aggregated these into a
single type of motivation (mood management in Dickert et al.,
2011, or warm glow in Ferguson et al., 2012). Many other
researchers have measured only one type of anticipated emotion
(i.e., either anticipated guilt if not helping or anticipated warm
glow if helping). As mentioned above, a potential risk with this
procedure is that participants who are responding to questions
about anticipated warm glow if helping might also consider
anticipated guilt if not helping thus contaminating their warm
glow ratings. For this reason, we suggest that future studies
investigating prosocial motivations include both a measure of
anticipated negative emotions if not helping and a measure of
anticipated positive emotions if helping. The purpose of this
study was not primarily to contribute to the emotion and emotion
regulation literature (where this distinction usually is more clear),
but rather to suggest that researchers on prosocial motivations
include measures of both anticipated personal consequences if
not helping and of anticipated personal consequences if helping.
In two studies that explicitly separated anticipated guilt and
anticipated warm glow, it was found that Canadian adolescents
expected more negative emotions (e.g., guilt) if acting antisocially
than if not acting prosocially but that they expectedmore positive
emotions (e.g., warm glow) if acting prosocially than if not acting
antisocially (Krettenauer and Johnston, 2011; Krettenauer and
Jia, 2013). As noted by the authors, the negative responsibility
to refrain from harming is in general perceived as stronger
than the positive responsibility to help. We agree, but argue
that responsibility to help can vary a lot depending on the
situation. For example, deciding whether or not to donate a
large sum of money to a charity rally benefitting unknown
victims (as in the scenario described in Krettenauer and Jia,
2013, p. 354) is a good example of a low-responsibility helping
decision. The authors find that anticipated warm glow is more
important than anticipated guilt for activating prosocial behavior
using this and other scenarios (not printed in the article). We
think their conclusion is true if the helping behavior is seen as
non-obligatory (as in their example scenario) but suggest that
the opposite might be true when helping is seen as obligatory.
One could even argue that while a decision not to help in
low-responsibility situations will be consistently perceived as an
omission, a decision not to help in a high-responsibility situation
might be perceived as an action despite still being an omission
(for a related discussion see e.g., Knobe, 2010).
Another question concerns whether anticipated guilt and
warm glow should be seen as purely egoistic reasons for helping
or if there also are altruistic elements in these motivations?
According to Batson (2011), helping behavior motivated by
anticipated guilt and/or by anticipated warm glow is egoistic as
the focus is on oneself. On the other hand, if the reason for
deciding to help is empathic concern, and if anticipated guilt
and/or anticipated warm glow are merely foreseen side-effects,
then the motivation could be altruistic even if one’s decision also
implies less guilt or more warm glow for the helper. In practice
however, it seems nearly impossible to know which emotion that
is the reason for helping and which emotion that is a foreseen
side-effect. Relatedly, it has been suggested that people who have
self-related reasons for helping are perceived as less praiseworthy
(e.g., Lin-Healy and Small, 2012; Newman and Cain, 2014), but at
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the same time, people experiencing warm glow after helping are
perceived as moremoral than people not experiencing it (Barasch
et al., 2014). Possibly, people like helpers who do not anticipate,
but who still experience positive emotions after helping, as this
would indicate that they are altruistically motivated but still have
the ability to experience typically human emotions. Importantly,
these studies focused on positive personal consequences if
helping. How people perceive guilt-motivated helping compared
to warm-glow motivated helping is an interesting topic for future
studies on social signaling.
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
FUTURE STUDIES
One limitation of the current study is that it has not focused
on how anticipated guilt and anticipated warm glow influence
actual helping. Anticipated negative emotions if not helping
and anticipated positive emotions if helping have both been
shown to predict helping intentions, and both dispositional guilt-
motivation and dispositional warm glow-motivation significantly
predict helping after controlling for the other (Gebauer et al.,
2008). Helping intentions was in fact measured exploratory
with a single item in Study 3 and 4 and the results are
reported in Appendix 2. A quick look at the findings reveal that
anticipated guilt is a clearly better predictor of helping intentions
than anticipated warm glow in all helping scenarios, but there
are no interpretable interactions with the different versions
meaning that anticipated guilt is the relatively better predictor
of helping intentions both in the low-responsibility situations
and in the high-responsibility situations. Future studies should
systematically investigate if there are some situations where
actual helping behavior is primarily motivated by anticipated
guilt and other situations where helping is primarily motivated
by anticipated warm glow.
A different type of limitation is the broad definitions of
guilt and warm glow. Admittedly, warm glow includes both
the positive emotion elicited from others happiness (positive
empathy; Andreychik and Migliaccio, 2015) and the positive
emotion elicited from one’s own desirable achievements (pride),
and these positive emotions might not always predict reactions
and behavior in the same way. Likewise, it can be argued that guilt
is primarily internalized blame and that warm glow is primarily
internalized praise. We agree but think these are very difficult
to separate empirically. Also, our results from Study 2 suggested
that the general pattern of results did not differ significantly if
we measured guilt and warm glow as anticipated emotions or
anticipated perceptions of one’s self-image. Studies by Janoff-
Bulman et al. (2009) show that people blame proscriptive
violations (causing harm) more than prescriptive violations
(failing to help), but that they praise proscriptive good deeds
(not causing harm) less than prescriptive good deeds (helping),
and that this pattern arise because proscriptive morality is our
responsibility whereas prescriptive morality is not. These results
correspond nicely to ours (and to Krettenauer and Johnston’s
2011), but differ in the sense that we manipulated responsibility
only within the prescriptive morality and that we focused
on anticipated internalized blame (i.e., guilt) and anticipated
internalized praise (warm glow) rather than actual blame and
praise.
CONCLUSION
It has long been acknowledged that one important motivation
for helping others is to improve one’s mood or to “feel better.”
However, it has not been clear if this mood improvement
primarily is about avoiding negative emotions, approaching
positive emotions, or both. Therefore, this study tested if
anticipated guilt if not helping and anticipated warm glow
if helping were similarly or differently affected by different
types of responsibility-manipulations. The results showed that
anticipated guilt if not helping is higher in situations where the
responsibility to help is high but that anticipated warm glow
if helping often show the opposite pattern and is higher in
situations where the responsibility to help is low. In sum, the
results suggest that we anticipate guilt if not doing our duty but
that we anticipate warm glow primarily when doing over and
beyond our duty.
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